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Institutionalized ReasonThe Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy$
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Matthias Klatt

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199582068

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582068.001.0001

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Defect and Deviance in Natural Law Jurisprudence

Defect and Deviance in Natural Law Jurisprudence

(p.45) 3 Defect and Deviance in Natural Law Jurisprudence
Institutionalized Reason

Mark C. Murphy

Oxford University Press

Both John Finnis and Robert Alexy hold that law that lacks an adequate rational basis for compliance is defective as law. But only Alexy offers the right sort of argument to sustain this thesis. To defend natural law jurisprudence, however, is to defend the view that such non-defectiveness conditions play a central role in explaining law's existence conditions. It is thus crucial for natural law jurisprudence that it follow Alexy's rather than Finnis's lead.

Keywords:   John Finnis, Robert Alexy, natural law jurisprudence

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