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Origins of Objectivity$
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Tyler Burge

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199581405

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581405.001.0001

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Neo‐Kantian Individual Representationalism: Strawson and Evans

Neo‐Kantian Individual Representationalism: Strawson and Evans

(p.154) 6 Neo‐Kantian Individual Representationalism: Strawson and Evans
Origins of Objectivity

Tyler Burge (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter focuses on one strand of 20th-century neo-Kantianism. It begins with some brief remarks about Kant. It then discusses second-family neo-Kantian Individual Representationalism in Strawson and Evans. Strawson's work produced a train of variants on neo-Kantian Individual Representationalism. He developed four main themes primarily within his project of accounting for our conception of objectivity. Because Strawson blurred lines between that project and the project of accounting for constitutive conditions on objective representation, many post-Strawsonian philosophers, like Evans, developed Strawsonian themes within this latter project without serious argument.

Keywords:   Kant, Strawson, Evans, neo-Kantian individual representationalism, perception, objectivity

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