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Meaning, Mind, and MatterPhilosophical Essays$
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Ernie Lepore and Barry Loewer

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199580781

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580781.001.0001

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Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough

Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough

Chapter:
(p.215) 14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough
Source:
Meaning, Mind, and Matter
Author(s):

Barry Loewer (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580781.003.0015

Jaegwon Kim famously argues that no form of “non‐reductive physicalism,” including Davidson's anomalism monism, can provide an adequate account of mental causation. His argument depends on a principle he calls “exclusion” that says, in effect, that if an event has a sufficient physical causal explanation then it doesn't also have an “independent” psychological explanation. This chapter counters by arguing that the exclusion principle depends on a metaphysically loaded account of causation. The chapter develops the counterfactual account of causation discussed in earlier chapters to rebut Kim's argument.

Keywords:   J. Kim, D. Davidson, non‐reductive physicalism, anomalism monism, causal explanation, exclusion principle, causation

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