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From Rationality to Equality$
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James P. Sterba

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199580767

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580767.001.0001

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Alternative Justifications for Morality

Alternative Justifications for Morality

(p.86) 5 Alternative Justifications for Morality
From Rationality to Equality

James P. Sterba

Oxford University Press

In general, there are three kinds of justifications for morality that must be taken into account before the justification provided in this book can be fully endorsed. First, there is a need to consider the possibility of other Kantian justifications of morality. This is done in the previous chapter. Second, there is the need to consider Hobbesian justifications for morality grounded in self-interest. Accordingly, this chapter takes up the justifications for morality developed by Kurt Baier and David Gauthier. Third, there is the need to consider Aristotelian justifications for morality grounded in personal flourishing or eudemonia. This is done by recasting the Kantian-inspired argument from rationality to morality into an Aristotelian framework. This chapter also consider a widely popular Aristotelian conception of morality developed by Ayn Rand because it strongly clashes with the justification of morality defended in this book.

Keywords:   Kantian, Hobbesian, Aristotellian, Ayn Rand, Kurt Baier, David Gauthier

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