In this chapter, the focus is on the importance of self‐interest for axiological aspects of morality and justice. According to the theory about self‐interest defended in chapter 4, the Prudential View, self‐interests are functions of both welfare and Relation M. However, in order not to introduce too many complicating factors all at once, the discussion of the importance of Relation M for outcome value is postponed until Chapter 10. Having set aside the issue of Relation M, an account of person‐affecting welfarism is developed, according to which outcome value is an increasing person‐affecting function only of individual welfare. This function is person‐affecting in the sense that, of two outcomes, one can be better (worse) than the other, only if there is someone for whom it is better (worse), or someone for whom the other outcome is worse (better).
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