Robust Realism and related views are sometimes criticized because they are committed to a view of normative reasons that divorces them from what brings us to action, from motivation. In order to address all versions of this worry, the chapter starts with a general account of what it is for an agent to act for a specific reason. The account is motivated independently of Robust Realism, and is then shown to be consistent with Robust Realism. Then, the chapter surveys the main objections to Robust Realism having to do with motivation: Worries emphasizing the practicality of normative judgments (but it is not clear what the practicality requirement comes to, and plausible versions of it are easily accommodated by Robust Realism), those having to do with why-be-moral questions (but some of these are pseudo-questions, and those that aren't can be satisfactorily answered consistently with Robust Realism), those having to do with judgment-internalism (but no non-trivial version of it is true, and Robust Realism can accommodate the relevant intuitions by endorsing contingent yet empirically robust relations between normative judgments and motivation), and existence internalism (which, it is argued, is intuitively implausible, and is not at all well-supported by the arguments for it in the literature).
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