Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. This chapter is an attempt at understanding how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical and meta-normative realism. The chapter distinguishes between many different arguments that are not often as clearly distinguished, and critically evaluates their force against Robust Realism. Such a critical survey reveals that some of the arguments fail rather clearly; others supply with a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully; yet others beg the question against the realist; and others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that — when carefully stated — can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement, and are thus discussed elsewhere in this book.
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