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Taking Morality SeriouslyA Defense of Robust Realism$
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David Enoch

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579969

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001

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Doing with Less

Doing with Less

Chapter:
(p.100) 5 Doing with Less
Source:
Taking Morality Seriously
Author(s):

David Enoch

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.003.0005

This chapter critically discusses three families of attempts to give the metaethical or meta-normative realist pretty much all that she wants, without resorting to the metaphysical extravagance of Robust Realism. The first is an attempt at a kind of naturalism that accommodates (by reduction, with this word sufficiently broadly understood) normativity. Naturalism is rejected mostly by emphasizing the thought that normative truths and facts are just too different from natural ones to be a subset thereof. The second family of views discussed are a host of error-theories and fictionalist views. These are rejected mostly because they cannot accommodate the kind of objectivity argued for in Chapter 2. Lastly, a host of quietist thoughts — according to which, roughly, a fairly robustly realist view can be had with no heavy metaphysical commitments — are analyzed, distinguished, and rejected.

Keywords:   naturalism, reduction, error theory, fictionalism, quietism, Scanlon

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