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Taking Morality SeriouslyA Defense of Robust Realism$
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David Enoch

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579969

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001

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The View, the Motivation, the Book

The View, the Motivation, the Book

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 The View, the Motivation, the Book
Source:
Taking Morality Seriously
Author(s):

David Enoch

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.003.0001

In this chapter, Robust Realism — the metanormative view defended in the book — is characterized. The chapter then introduces the book's guiding intuition: any other metaethical and metanormative view will fail to accommodate our taking morality sufficiently seriously, and describes how it is fleshed out in the rest of the book. The program for the whole book is described and motivated, and the underlying philosophical methodology explicitly presented: No view is likely to beat its opponents by some kind of a philosophical knockout, and so we should settle for tallying plausibility points of competing theories. The aim of the book, then, is to show where Robust Realism earns significant plausibility points — in better accommodating taking morality seriously — and also that it doesn't lose too many plausibility points because of common objections to the view.

Keywords:   methodology, morality, metaethics, Robust Realism

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