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Partiality and ImpartialityMorality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World$
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Brian Feltham and John Cottingham

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579952

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001

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Introduction: Partiality and Impartiality in Ethics *

Introduction: Partiality and Impartiality in Ethics *

Chapter:
(p.1) Introduction: Partiality and Impartiality in Ethics*
Source:
Partiality and Impartiality
Author(s):

Brian Feltham

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0001

This introductory chapter presents the notions of partiality and impartiality, as well as some of the key issues connected with them in ethical theory, such as the issue of the extent of the demands morality can place on us. It offers an historical overview of their importance in ethical theory by looking at the different ways they emerge from, and are embodied in, the theories of a range of key figures from Plato to Mill. Figures discussed include: Nagel, Scanlon, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Smith, Hume, Kant, and Mill.

Keywords:   ethics, demandingness, historical, impartiality, partiality

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