Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Spectres of False DivinityHume's Moral Atheism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Thomas Holden

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579945

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579945.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 April 2020

The Argument from Motivation

The Argument from Motivation

Chapter:
(p.115) 5 The Argument from Motivation
Source:
Spectres of False Divinity
Author(s):

Thomas Holden (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579945.003.0005

This chapter documents and examines Hume's argument from motivation to moral atheism. The argument appeals to Hume's account of the passions as the engines of action along with a form of probabilistic reasoning about the likely character of any first cause or ultimate organizing principle responsible for the ordered universe. According to Hume, even though we know nothing positive about the distinctive intrinsic character of the deity, we can judge it highly unlikely that this ultimate being or principle has the sort of anthropomorphic sentimental psychology required to ground any responsiveness to moral concerns.

Keywords:   deity, Hume, motivation, passions, moral atheism, sentimental psychology, sentiments

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .