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Social Epistemology$
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Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199577477

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001

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The Epistemology of Disagreement

The Epistemology of Disagreement

(p.278) 14 The Epistemology of Disagreement
Social Epistemology

Ernest Sosa (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter takes up one main question: When and how can a belief be sustained reasonably in the face of known disagreement? The answer to this question will depend on our prospects for sustaining cherished opinions in fields where controversy abounds, such as religion, politics, history, morality, art, philosophy, and even medicine and the law.

Keywords:   controversy, disagreement in belief, reasonable retention, belief

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