Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Lying and DeceptionTheory and Practice$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Thomas L. Carson

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199577415

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 October 2019

Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying

Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying

Chapter:
(p.67) 3 Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying
Source:
Lying and Deception
Author(s):

Thomas L. Carson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0004

In several works, Kant claims that lying is always wrong, no matter what. He is probably the most well‐known defender of an absolute prohibition against lying in the history of Western philosophy. The chapter surveys what Kant says about lying in his writings. It is noteworthy that he never directly appeals to the categorical imperative in any of his arguments to show that lying is always wrong. The chapter argues that the universal law version of the categorical imperative does not imply that lying is always wrong – one can consistently will that everyone follows maxims or principles that sometimes permit lying. Korsgaard to the contrary, the second version of the categorical imperative, which says that we should never treat another person as a mere means, does not imply that lying is never permissible. The chapter contends that Korsgaard's arguments rest on contentious interpretations of several ambiguous passages in Kant. None of the versions of the categorical imperative commits Kant to an absolute prohibition against lying. Not only does Kant fail to give a compelling argument for an absolute prohibition against lying, there are positive reasons to reject his absolutism. The duty not to lie can conflict with other moral duties. If lying is always wrong no matter what, then the duty not to lie must always be more important than any conflicting duty. However, it is most implausible to hold that the duty not to lie is always more important than any conflicting duty. Kant's own example of lying to thwart the plans of a would‐be murderer is one of the best illustrations of this.

Keywords:   Kant on lying, murderer at door, definition of lying, absolutism, categorical imperative, Alan Wood, Christine Korsgaard, Ross

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .