Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Takashi Yagisawa

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199576890

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576890.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 January 2020

Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.1) Introduction
Source:
Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise
Author(s):

Takashi Yagisawa

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576890.003.0001

Modal realism says that non-actual possible worlds and individuals are as real as the actual world and individuals. This book defends modal realism of a variety different from David Lewis’s theory. The notion of reality is left primitive and sharply distinguished from that of existence, which is proposed as a relation between a thing and a domain. Worlds are postulated as modal indices for truth on a par with times, which are temporal indices for truth. Ordinary individual objects are conceived as being spread in spatial, temporal, and modal dimensions, and their transworld identity is explicated by the closest-continuer theory. Impossible worlds and individuals are postulated and used to provide accounts of propositions, belief sentences, and fictional discourse.

Keywords:   actual, belief sentence, existence, fiction, identity, impossible world, Kripke, Lewis, metaphysics, modal realism, possibility, possible world, proposition, real, transworld

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .