- Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties
Roger M. Barker
- Oxford University Press
The empirical evidence examined in this book is highly supportive of the idea that economic rents play a key role in determining the degree of association between partisanship and corporate governance change in nonliberal market economies. Economic rents are the key factor that mould the preferences of political parties vis‐à‐vis corporate governance policy, and determine the ability of such policy to translate into changes in firm‐level corporate governance outcomes.
European corporate governance, private equity, sovereign wealth funds, global financial crisis, government policy
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our
, and if you can't find the answer there, please