Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Causality in the Sciences$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199574131

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 26 June 2019

The autonomy of psychology in the age of neuroscience

The autonomy of psychology in the age of neuroscience

Chapter:
(p.202) 10 The autonomy of psychology in the age of neuroscience
Source:
Causality in the Sciences
Author(s):

Ken Aizawa

Carl Gillett

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.003.0010

The implications of multiple realization for scientific methodology have recently been hotly debated. For example, neuroscientists have discovered distinct realizations for what appears to be a single psychological property and some philosophers have recently maintained that in such cases scientists will always abandon commitment to the single, multiply realized psychological property in favour of two, or more, uniquely realized psychological properties. This chapter explores such methodological claims by building on the dimensioned theory of realization and a companion theory of multiple realization. Using concrete cases, this chapter shows that such an ‘eliminate-and-split’ methodology is not always the case in actual practice. Furthermore, this chapter also establishes that whether scientists postulate unique or multiple realizations is not determined by the neuroscience alone, but only in concert with the psychological theory under examination. Thus, in a sense this chapter articulates, in the splitting or non-splitting of properties, psychology enjoys a kind of autonomy from neuroscience.

Keywords:   realization, multiple realization, methodology, dimensioned view of realization, human color vision

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .