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Spheres of ReasonNew Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity$
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Simon Robertson

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199572939

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.001.0001

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How Reasons for Action Differ from Reasons for Belief

How Reasons for Action Differ from Reasons for Belief

(p.140) 6 How Reasons for Action Differ from Reasons for Belief
Spheres of Reason

Alan Millar (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

It is assumed to be constitutive of believing that p that one is sensitive to whether or not it is true that p. Sensitivity, it is suggested, requires sensitivity to the requirements imposed by a certain truth-prescription. The truth-prescription dictates that a reason to believe that p must be such that believing that p for that reason is conducive to realizing belief's constitutive aim. It is argued that there is a constitutive aim of intentional action that can shed light on reasons for action: to act in such a way that one's action should have an aim-dependent point in the sense that the action should not be pointless given the intention informing it. This is argued to be more plausible than the classical view that the constitutive aim of intentional action is to realize some good.

Keywords:   action, belief, constitutive aim, reasons, truth-prescription

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