Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Linking Citizens and PartiesHow Electoral Systems Matter for Political Representation$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Lawrence Ezrow

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199572526

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572526.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 11 December 2019

Parties' Policy Programs and the Dog that Did not Bark: No Evidence that Proportional Systems Promote Extreme Party Positioning

Parties' Policy Programs and the Dog that Did not Bark: No Evidence that Proportional Systems Promote Extreme Party Positioning

Chapter:
(p.41) 3 Parties' Policy Programs and the Dog that Did not Bark: No Evidence that Proportional Systems Promote Extreme Party Positioning
Source:
Linking Citizens and Parties
Author(s):

Lawrence Ezrow (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572526.003.0003

There is extensive theoretical research that explores the linkages between parties' policy positions, on the one hand, and the characteristics of the political system (i.e., voting rules and the number of parties) on the other, but empirical research on this topic is less developed. Building on earlier work by Jay Dow, this chapter reports empirical analyses exploring the connections between the average party policy extremism in fifteen party systems (defined as the average party policy distance from the party system Center), and two important system‐level variables: the proportionality of the electoral laws used to select representatives to the national legislature, and the number of political parties. Contrary to expectations – but consistent with theoretical work by Norman Schofield and his coauthors – no evidence is found that average party policy extremism increases under proportional representation, nor that policy extremism increases in countries that feature large numbers of parties.

Keywords:   electoral systems, centripetal incentives, centrifugal incentives, party system size, party extremism, Cox, Schofield, Dow, polarization, dispersion, valence, party competition, party strategies, party positions, spatial model

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .