- Title Pages
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Chapter 1 What Have We Learned from Market Design?
- Chapter 2 Not up to Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior
- Chapter 3 Using and Abusing Auction Theory
- Chapter 4 Market Design for Kidney Exchange
- Chapter 5 School Choice
- Chapter 6 Improving Efficiency in School Choice
- Chapter 7 Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?
- Chapter 8 Designing Markets for Ideas
- Chapter 9 Redesigning Microcredit
- Chapter 10 The Product‐Mix Auction
- Chapter 11 Optimal Incentives in Core‐Selecting Auctions
- Chapter 12 Auctioning Rough Diamonds
- Chapter 13 Ending Rules in Internet Auctions
- Chapter 14 Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents
- Chapter 15 The Design of Online Advertising Markets
- Chapter 16 Very‐Large‐Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi‐Attribute Auctions
- Chapter 17 Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwidth
- Chapter 18 A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems
- Chapter 19 Legislation with Endogenous Preferences
- Chapter 20 Common‐Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs
- Chapter 21 Information Disclosure in Auctions
- Chapter 22 Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
- Chapter 23 The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill
- Chapter 24 Competing Mechanisms
- Chapter 25 Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets
- (p.138) Chapter 5 School Choice
- The Handbook of Market Design
- Oxford University Press
School choice has presented economists with opportunities to study and design student assignment systems, which in turn have helped push forward the frontiers of mechanism design theory. This chapter discusses the student assignment problem in school choice, related issues, assignment mechanisms and new developments in the theory and practice of mechanism design within the context of school choice.
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