Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Walter Ott

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199570430

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 July 2019

The Aristotelian Background

The Aristotelian Background

Chapter:
(p.20) 3 The Aristotelian Background
Source:
Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy
Author(s):

Walter Ott (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.003.0004

Before turning to Descartes, we must first know something of the view he seeks to supplant. This chapter argues in detail that Aristotelian causation is logical necessitation. Even on the concurrentist picture, it is logically impossible for all of the requisite powers, plus God's concurrence, to obtain, and yet the effect not result. This chapter defends this interpretation from charges of triviality and historical anachronism. Next, it moves on to the ontology of relations, establishing a key feature of scholastic powers: their esse‐ad, or directedness. Finally, the chapter explains the contrast between manifest and occult qualities by way of showing how the scholastics link perceivability and intelligibility in their physics.

Keywords:   Cartesian predicament, ontology, Descartes, Régis, Hume

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .