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Cuts and CloudsVagueness, its Nature, & its Logic$
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Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199570386

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001

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Perceptual Indiscriminability and the Concept of a Color Shade

Perceptual Indiscriminability and the Concept of a Color Shade

Chapter:
(p.209) 12 Perceptual Indiscriminability and the Concept of a Color Shade
Source:
Cuts and Clouds
Author(s):

Leon Horsten

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0013

This chapter investigates the connection between indiscriminability with respect to colour, and the concept of a colour shade. A crucial question is whether indiscriminability is a transitive relation. If it is, then a simple identity criterion for colour shades can be straightforwardly expressed in terms of indiscriminability. If it is not, then we are driven to a less immediate identity criterion for colour shades, which is however still intimately linked to indiscriminability. In this situation, there is a sense in which the concept of a colour shade must be taken to be a low-level theoretical notion.

Keywords:   indiscriminability, perceptual indiscriminability, qualia, colour shade

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