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ModalityMetaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology$
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Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199565818

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001

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Merely Possible Propositions

Merely Possible Propositions

Chapter:
(p.21) 1 Merely Possible Propositions
Source:
Modality
Author(s):

Robert Stalnaker (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0002

This chapter argues that some propositions exist only contingently. Among the contingently existing propositions are ‘possible worlds’, which are understood as maximal consistent propositions. The chapter sketches a picture of propositions and possible worlds that tries to make sense of this thesis, and defends it against two closely related arguments (by Alvin Plantinga and Timothy Williamson) that aim to refute it. The thesis and the response to the arguments require a distinction between the claim that a proposition has the monadic property of truth and the claim that it is true of a given possible world; this distinction is explained and defended.

Keywords:   contingency, proposition, possible world, truth, Alvin Plantinga, Timothy Williamson

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