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Turning Images in Philosophy, Science, and ReligionA New Book of Nature$
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Charles Taliaferro and Jil Evans

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199563340

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563340.001.0001

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Naturalism, Imagination, and the Scientific Worldview

Naturalism, Imagination, and the Scientific Worldview

(p.91) Five Naturalism, Imagination, and the Scientific Worldview
Turning Images in Philosophy, Science, and Religion

E. J. Lowe

Oxford University Press

This chapter develops a challenge to naturalistic accounts of human thought and understanding, drawing on insights that we ultimately owe to Immanuel Kant concerning the intimate relationship between concepts, perceptual experience, and our imaginative capacities. The focus is on two recent naturalistic theories — those of the philosopher David Chalmers and the evolutionary anthropologist Merlin Donald — both of whom appeal to the idea that the human mind/brain is essentially an information-processing system. It is argued that the notion of information relied on by such theorists is too thin to serve its intended purpose.

Keywords:   concepts, David Chalmers, Merlin Donald, Immanuel Kant, imagination, information, naturalism, perception

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