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Beyond Consequentialism$
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Paul Hurley

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199559305

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559305.001.0001

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Impartial Evaluation and Rational Authority

Impartial Evaluation and Rational Authority

(p.177) 7 Impartial Evaluation and Rational Authority
Beyond Consequentialism

Paul Hurley (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The arguments in the first half of this chapter demonstrate that an account of moral standards based upon an interpersonal conception of impartiality, in stark contrast with its impersonal counterpart, has ample resources to establish the rational authority of its moral standards. In particular, it is argued that the impartial second-personal reasons identified by Stephen Darwall presuppose the rational authority of interpersonal moral reasons. In the second half of the chapter it is argued that the recognition of a foundational role for the interpersonal conception of impartiality in the moral evaluation of actions is supported by deep structural features of practical, as opposed to theoretical, reason. This argument proceeds first by arguing against the aspects of Thomas Nagel's account of practical reason, which suggest that the structural features of objective practical reason preclude a fundamental role for such an interpersonal conception of impartiality in the evaluation of action.

Keywords:   Darwall, Nagel, second-personal reasons, theoretical reason, practical reason, objective reason, interpersonal conception, impartiality

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