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Epistemological Disjunctivism$
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Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199557912

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001

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Relevant Alternatives and Closure

Relevant Alternatives and Closure

(p.68) §2. Relevant Alternatives and Closure
Epistemological Disjunctivism

Duncan Pritchard

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins with a discussion of the closure principle and the problem it poses for the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge. It then turns to a new position known as contrastivism, which denies the closure principle. According to the contrastivist, knowledge is to be always understood contrastively, in the sense that one never knows that p simpliciter. Instead, one knows that p rather than each one of a set of contrasts (i.e., alternatives) to p, where knowing that a proposition obtains rather than one of the contrasts is explicitly understood in terms of discriminating the target proposition from the specified contrasts.

Keywords:   closure principle, relevant alternative account, perceptual knowledge, contrastivism

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