Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Demands of ReasonAn Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Casey Perin

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199557905

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557905.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 December 2019

The Scope of Scepticism

The Scope of Scepticism

(p.59) 3 The Scope of Scepticism
The Demands of Reason

Casey Perin (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The Scope of Scepticism is the range of candidates for belief about which the Sceptic, in virtue of being a Sceptic, suspends judgement. This chapter argues that Sextus places a restriction on the Sceptic's suspension of judgement, and so on the scope of Scepticism, insofar as he attributes, as he does at Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.13, some beliefs to the Sceptic. As a result an adequate interpretation of the scope of Scepticism must draw a distinction between two kinds of belief. Dogmatic belief is belief of the kind the Sceptic, in virtue of his Scepticism, lacks; and non‐dogmatic belief is belief of the kind his Scepticism permits him to have. This chapter argues, against a line of interpretation advanced by Michael Frede, that for Sextus the distinction between dogmatic and non‐dogmatic belief is the distinction between belief about how things are and belief about how things merely appear to one to be.

Keywords:   Sextus Empiricus, belief, apppearances, dogmata, Frede, insulation, Burnyeat, pathos

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .