In summary, the start of this essay provided two accounts of the nature of color in terms of a distinction between relationalist accounts and non-relationalist accounts. A novel taxonomy of the theoretical landscape is then offered that puts forward color relationalism. A series of challenges concerning relationalism is then examined and considered to be unsuccessful by the author. Having argued for the claim that one should embrace a relationalist ontology of color, several objections about relationalism are investigated. The accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, or that it cannot be coherently combined with plausible theories of the nature of color phenomenology is also explored. Further, the role functionalist form of relationalism is defended and compared with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents.
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