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The Normativity of NatureEssays on Kant's Critique of Judgement$
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Hannah Ginsborg

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199547975

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547975.001.0001

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Thinking the Particular as Contained Under the Universal

Thinking the Particular as Contained Under the Universal

(p.148) Essay 7 Thinking the Particular as Contained Under the Universal
The Normativity of Nature

Hannah Ginsborg

Oxford University Press

This essay argues for a connection between two kinds of universality in Kant’s theory of judgement: the universality by which a concept can apply to a multiplicity of objects, and the universality by which a judgement makes a claim on a multiplicity of judging subjects. It argues that the former kind of universality depends on the latter. This view is defended both on the grounds that it is needed in order to make intelligible Kant’s view of how we acquire empirical concepts, and on the grounds that it explains why the Critique of Judgement describes judgements of beauty as manifesting the faculty of judgement in general. The most fundamental characterization of the faculty of judgement is as a capacity to regard one’s mental response to an object as universal in the second sense, and this capacity is manifested, as such, in aesthetic judgement.

Keywords:   aesthetic judgement, empirical concepts, normativity, universality, Hume

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