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Our Knowledge of the Internal World$
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Robert C. Stalnaker

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199545995

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.001.0001

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Phenomenal and Epistemic Indistinguishability

Phenomenal and Epistemic Indistinguishability

Chapter:
(p.75) 4 Phenomenal and Epistemic Indistinguishability
Source:
Our Knowledge of the Internal World
Author(s):

Robert C. Stalnaker (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.003.0004

This chapter returns to Jackson's example of Mary, using the account of essentially self-locating information developed in Chapter 3 to clarify the relation between the informational content of Mary's knowledge and her connection to it. One source of resistance to the analogy between phenomenal information and essentially self-locating information is identified: an implicit assumption (labeled ‘the principle of phenomenal indistinguishability’) that a possible situation is epistemically indistinguishable from the actual situation only if it is phenomenally indistinguishable from it. It is argued, using a variation on Jackson's thought experiment, that this principle should be rejected, but that rejecting requires giving up a foundationalist conception of intentionality.

Keywords:   self-locating information, foundationalism, intentionality, Jackson, phenomenal information

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