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Anti-Externalism$
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Joseph Mendola

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199534999

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.001.0001

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Qualia and Sensory Content

Qualia and Sensory Content

Chapter:
(p.173) 7 Qualia and Sensory Content
Source:
Anti-Externalism
Author(s):

Joseph Mendola (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0007

This chapter argues that the correct internalist account of perceptual experience involves four key claims, that sensory contents are qualia, that experiences of qualia are constituted in a necessary a posteriori manner by internal physical states, that these states have the modal structural architecture pioneered for color experience by Hardin, and that intentionalism is the correct account of the semantic contribution of these experiences. It considers contrary externalist arguments, including arguments rooted in the claim of Williamson and Harman that knowledge is a basic mental state, in Kant's Refutation of Idealism, and in disjunctivism.

Keywords:   qualia, necessary a posteriori, intentionalism, Hardin, disjunctivism, Refutation of Idealism, Williamson, Harman, perceptual experience

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