Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Punishment and ResponsibilityEssays in the Philosophy of Law$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

H.L.A. Hart

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199534777

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 23 July 2019

NEGLIGENCE, MENS REA, AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

NEGLIGENCE, MENS REA, AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Chapter:
(p.136) VI NEGLIGENCE, MENS REA, AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Source:
Punishment and Responsibility
Author(s):

H. L. A. Hart

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.003.0006

This chapter reviews Dr. Turner's famous essay on negligence, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law. The chapter then argues that Turner's conclusions about the place of negligence in the common law rest on a mistaken conception, both of the way in which mental or ‘subjective’ elements are involved in human action, and of the reasons why we attach the great importance which we do to the principle that liability to criminal punishment should be conditional on the presence of a mental element. These misconceptions have not been sufficiently examined: yet they are widely shared and much encouraged by traditional legal ways of talking about the relevance of the mind to responsibility.

Keywords:   criminal law, criminal punishment, common law, human action, mental element

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .