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Externalism and the Mental$
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Madhucchanda Sen

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199453603

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199453603.001.0001

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Externalism and the Inner–Outer Distinction

Externalism and the Inner–Outer Distinction

Chapter:
(p.160) 4 Externalism and the Inner–Outer Distinction
Source:
Externalism and the Mental
Author(s):

Madhucchanda Sen

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199453603.003.0004

In the final chapter it is claimed that the history of the debate shows that we must give up the inner–outer distinction. This move was initiated by an anti-Cartesian line of thinking. To this extent this is an externalist move. What is being claimed to be finally achieved is a view which reinterprets the mind–body relation as a relation which is constitutive of both the relata. The author claims that phenomenologists have, in a more substantial way, been able to show how exactly this relation is constitutive of both the relata. There is an affinity between the views of Husserl and the externalist John McDowell. According to the phenomenological view, the mind and world are not distinct entities; rather they are bound constitutively together.

Keywords:   inner–outer distinction, Kant, Myth of the Given, empirical knowledge, conceptual content, non-conceptual content of experience, phenomenological, Husserl, McDowell

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