This chapter argues that panpsychism is a genuine and clearly delineated position. It focuses on Russellian panpsychism in its currently most discussed version. He defends a form of ontological monism, which takes the structural features of the world described by physics to be ontologically incomplete. They require a carrier, and phenomenal properties are the best candidate for being the ultimate carriers of physical structure. It is therefore a dual-aspect monism. The chapter claims that nonconstitutive panpsychism has an edge over its constitutive cousin by accounting for the existence of macrosubjects via strong emergence. This is also its greatest problem since the avoidance of strong emergence seems to be the strongest motive for the endorsement of panpsychism. To resolve this problem, a distinction between strong and superstrong emergence is introduced. Emergent dualism requires the latter and is thus open to an attack via the genetic argument for panpsychism.
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