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The Two SelvesTheir Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence$
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Stanley B. Klein

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199349968

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199349968.001.0001

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Empirical Evidence and the Ontological and Epistemological Selves

Empirical Evidence and the Ontological and Epistemological Selves

Chapter:
(p.81) Chapter 5 Empirical Evidence and the Ontological and Epistemological Selves
Source:
The Two Selves
Author(s):

Stanley B. Klein

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199349968.003.0005

Chapter 5 considers arguments for the need for both immaterial and material aspects of reality in general and the self in particular. I present evidence from case studies (e.g., patients suffering anosognosia, depersonalization, schizophrenic thought insertion) showing that one can lose one’s sense of personal ownership of one’s mental states (e.g., the thought/memory is in my head, but it is not mine!) while still maintaining a clear sense of one’s material and immaterial self. This dissociation, I argue, hints that the “sense of personal ownership” may be what unites these two metaphysically separable aspects of self.

Keywords:   Personal ownership, functional independence, case studies, phenomenology, verbal reports, empiricism

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