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The Two Selves – Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence - Oxford Scholarship Online
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The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence

Stanley B. Klein


In this book, I take the position that the self is not a “thing” easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. I argue that to fully appreciate the self, i ... More

Keywords: Self, Consciousness, Reality, Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, Psychopathology, Metaphysics, Science, Phenomenology

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2013 Print ISBN-13: 9780199349968
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199349968.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Stanley B. Klein, author
Department of Psychology, University of California Santa Barbara