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OmissionsAgency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility$
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Randolph Clarke

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199347520

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347520.001.0001

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Inability and Responsibility for Inaction

Inability and Responsibility for Inaction

(p.135) Chapter 6 Inability and Responsibility for Inaction

Randolph Clarke

Oxford University Press

Frankfurt cases are thought to show that one can be directly responsible for performing a certain action even if one could not have done otherwise. Are there Frankfurt cases of inaction—cases showing that one can be directly responsible for not doing a certain thing even if one could not have done that thing? An argument that there are no such cases is examined, and an opposing argument is offered. It is concluded that the matter remains uncertain.

Keywords:   ability, action, Frankfurt cases, inaction, omission, responsibility

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