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Weighing Reasons$
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Errol Lord and Barry Maguire

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199315192

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.001.0001

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Value and the Weight of Practical Reasons

Value and the Weight of Practical Reasons

(p.141) 7 Value and the Weight of Practical Reasons
Weighing Reasons

Joseph Raz

Oxford University Press

Assuming that the value of options (actions, activities, or omissions) constitutes the proximate reason for pursuing them, this chapter considers whether we have reason to promote or maximise value. A proper argument would require establishing a negative, but raising doubts is less demanding—explaining some aspects of the relation between values and reasons that enable us to dispense with the doubtful thesis by illustrating alternative relations between values and reasons. Theses that value should be promoted are accompanied by a way of determining the strength of reasons (the stronger reason promotes more value). This chapter develops theoretical doubts about promotion of value and argues that the disagreement is not merely terminological. Even though the value of things and activities is a reason to engage with them, there is not always reason to choose the best. The concluding section touches on the limits of the argument and its importance.

Keywords:   practical reasons, value-based reasons, weight of reasons, promoting value, value

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