Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Weighing Reasons$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Errol Lord and Barry Maguire

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199315192

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 May 2020

How Do Reasons Accrue?

How Do Reasons Accrue?

Chapter:
(p.56) 3 How Do Reasons Accrue?
Source:
Weighing Reasons
Author(s):

Shyam Nair

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0003

There are situations where people have multiple reasons to do a certain action, a, that are individually worse than a reason to do another incompatible act. But in some of these cases, the reasons to do a taken together (which can be called the accrual of the reasons to do a) make it so that you ought to do a. This chapter explores how the weight of individual reasons determines how strongly an accrual of reasons supports an act. It argues that a key to understanding how individual reasons determine how strongly an accrual supports an act is to distinguish sharply between derivative and non-derivative reasons.

Keywords:   accrual, derivative reasons, non-derivative reasons, confirmation theory

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .