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Weighing Reasons$
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Errol Lord and Barry Maguire

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199315192

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.001.0001

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Making the “Hard” Problem of Moral Normativity Easier

Making the “Hard” Problem of Moral Normativity Easier

Chapter:
(p.257) 13 Making the “Hard” Problem of Moral Normativity Easier
Source:
Weighing Reasons
Author(s):

Stephen Darwall

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0013

It is often assumed that the proposition that agents have (even) some reason to comply with moral obligations is more ambitious philosophically, or more difficult to establish or justify, than that they have reason to do what is in their interest or would fulfill their aims or desires. It is argued that this is not the case, indeed, that the opposite is true. Although it is a conceptually open question whether there is any reason whatsoever for agents to do what is for their good or will advance their aims or desires, an analogous question concerning moral right and wrong is not conceptually open. This is so, it is argued, owing to conceptual connections between obligation and accountability and to inescapable presuppositions of holding someone accountable through moral blame.

Keywords:   normative reasons, right, wrong, deontic, obligation, blame, blameworthy, accountability, reactive attitude

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