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Slaves of the Passions$
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Mark Schroeder

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199299508

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.001.0001

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Motivation, Knowledge, and Virtue

Motivation, Knowledge, and Virtue

Chapter:
(p.164) 9 Motivation, Knowledge, and Virtue
Source:
Slaves of the Passions
Author(s):

Mark Schroeder (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.003.0009

This chapter extends the results of Chapter 8 to views about motivation, virtue, and knowledge. Since Hypotheticalism rejects Proportionalism, simple versions of internalism are rejected, and the view is defended that there are many ways in which someone can fail to be motivated in accordance with the strength of her reasons. To be motivated in accordance with the strength of your reasons, you must desire the right things, and to the right degree, and this is what virtue involves, according to Hypotheticalism's Aristotelian Doctrine. Two further problems are raised in moral epistemology, and it is shown that they can be solved by the view that desires represent things as reasons, and by Hypotheticalism's Aristotelian Doctrine.

Keywords:   virtue, internalism, Hypotheticalism's Aristotelian Doctrine, moral epistemology

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