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Slaves of the Passions$
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Mark Schroeder

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199299508

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.001.0001

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Too Few Reasons

Too Few Reasons

Chapter:
(p.103) 6 Too Few Reasons
Source:
Slaves of the Passions
Author(s):

Mark Schroeder (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.003.0006

This chapter considers the complementary objection that the Humean Theory fails to allow for some reasons that there intuitively are. The main problem is shown to be that of allowing for reasons that are genuinely agent-neutral: reasons for anyone, no matter what they are like, and which would be reasons for them, even if their desires were different. It is first shown that there is no logical conflict between such reasons and the Humean Theory, because some reasons may be overdetermined, by any possible desire. Then a model is given for how the Humean Theory can explain such reasons. A problem arises for both the arguments in this chapter and for those in Chapter 5 if the Humean Theory is committed to a certain thesis about the weight of reasons called Proportionalism, but this thesis is rejected.

Keywords:   reasons, genuine agent-neutrality, overdetermination, Proportionalism

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