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Slaves of the Passions$
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Mark Schroeder

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199299508

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.001.0001

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Too Many Reasons

Too Many Reasons

Chapter:
(p.84) 5 Too Many Reasons
Source:
Slaves of the Passions
Author(s):

Mark Schroeder (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.003.0005

This chapter explores whether the Humean Theory is committed to Too Many Reasons — the existence of reasons which intuitively are not reasons at all. After the objection is motivated, it is shown that some version of the objection is likely to arise even for very restricted versions of the Humean Theory. It is then shown that critics of the Humean Theory have taken this objection so seriously that they have used it as a premise in order to argue that the Humean Theory is literally incoherent — and in several different ways. The answer given to the objection is that it relies on negative existential intuitions about reasons, which are shown to be systematically unreliable, when the only reasons to do something are of very low weight.

Keywords:   reasons, incoherence arguments, negative existential intuitions, weight

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