This chapter begins the substantive exploration of the commitments of the Humean Theory of Reasons by investigating what we mean when we say that Ronnie has his reason because of his desire. The No Background Conditions view is proposed, according to which desires can't explain reasons without being part of them. It is shown that the No Background Conditions view plays a key role in a sophisticated version of the claim that the Humean Theory is committed to making good reasoning out to be Objectionably Self-Regarding, and in a further objection to the effect that it locates the explanation of reasons in the Wrong Place. Hypotheticalism's view about the background conditions on reasons is introduced, and arguments for the No Background Conditions view are diagnosed and dismissed.
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