- Title Pages
- List of Contributors
- Ten Ways to Know Paul A. Samuelson* **
- Introduction: The Significance of Paul A. Samuelson in the Twenty-First Century
- 1 Overlapping Generations
- 2 Paul Samuelson's Amazing Intergenerational Transfer
- 3 Social Security, the Government Budget, and National Savings
- 4 Prospective Shifts, Speculative Swings: “Macro” for the Twenty-First Century in the Tradition Championed by Paul Samuelson
- 5 Paul Samuelson and Global Public Goods
- 6 Revealed Preference
- 7 Samuelson's “Dr. Jekyll and Mrs. Jekyll” Problem: A Difficulty in the Concept of the Consumer
- 8 Paul Samuelson on Karl Marx: Were the Sacrificed Games of Tennis Worth It?
- 9 Paul Samuelson and the Stability of General Equilibrium
- 10 Paul Samuelson and Piero Sraffa—Two Prodigious Minds at the Opposite Poles
- 11 Paul Samuelson as a “Keynesian” Economist
- 12 Samuelson and the Keynes/Post Keynesian Revolution
- 13 Paul Samuelson and International Trade Theory Over Eight Decades
- 14 Paul Samuelson's Contributions to International Economics
- 15 Protection and Real Wages: The Stolper–Samuelson Theorem
- 16 Samuelson and the Factor Bias of Technological Change: Toward a Unified Theory of Growth and Unemployment
- 17 Samuelson and Investment for the Long Run
- 18 Paul Samuelson and Financial Economics
- 19 Multipliers and the LeChatelier Principle
- 20 The Surprising Ubiquity of the Samuelson Configuration: Paul Samuelson and the Natural Sciences
- 21 Paul Samuelson's Mach
- (p.99) 6 Revealed Preference
- Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Century
Hal R. Varian
- Oxford University Press
This chapter emphasizes the utility maximization of Samuelson's Revealed Preference Theory. It looks for consistency, form, forecasting, and recoverability criteria within the theory. It concludes that the strong axiom is necessary and sufficient for utility maximization, as well as rich in empirical content. The logic of the strong axiom runs as follows: If A reveals itself to be ‘better than’ B, and if B reveals itself to be ‘better than’ C, and if C reveals itself to be ‘better than’ D, and so on, then the theory of revealed preference is formulated. Furthermore, say that A can be defined to be ‘revealed to be better than’ Z, as the last in the chain. In such cases, it is postulated that Z must never be revealed to be better than A.
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