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A Virtue EpistemologyApt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199297023

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001

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Epistemic Normativity

Epistemic Normativity

Chapter:
(p.70) Lecture 4 Epistemic Normativity
Source:
A Virtue Epistemology
Author(s):

Ernest Sosa (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0004

This chapter gives a distinctive account of the normativity that is constitutive of knowledge. This account is used to throw light on the much discussed value problem that derives from Plato's Meno: how can knowledge (as such) be better than the corresponding true belief?

Keywords:   epistemic normativity, true belief, truth monism, intrinsic value, extrinsic value, epistemic credit, intellectual ethics

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