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Pascal's WagerPragmatic Arguments and Belief in God$
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Jeff Jordan

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199291328

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.001.0001

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The Problem of Infinite Utilities

The Problem of Infinite Utilities

Chapter:
(p.102) 4 The Problem of Infinite Utilities
Source:
Pascal's Wager
Author(s):

Jeff Jordan (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.003.0004

Pascal's Wager employed infinite utilities, but standard decision theory is incompatible with infinite utilities. In this chapter, the consequences of restricting the Wager to finite utilities are explored. The St. Petersburg paradox is also examined.

Keywords:   St. Petersburg paradox, infinite utility, finite utility, decision theory, hyperreals

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