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The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice$
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Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199290420

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.001.0001

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The Normative Status of the Independence Principle

The Normative Status of the Independence Principle

Chapter:
(p.140) CHAPTER 5 THE NORMATIVE STATUS OF THE INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE
Source:
The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice
Author(s):

Edward F. McClennen (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0006

Some version or other of what is known as the “independence principle” plays a ubiquitous role in the axiomatic derivation of the normative version of expected‐utility theory. The various versions are identified, and the arguments for each are critiqued. The conclusion is that none of the arguments for this or that version of the independence principle are convincing, and thus that the expected‐utility theory, as a normative theory, is itself much less secure than most have taken it to be.

Keywords:   independence axiom, sure‐thing principle, normative, sure ontcomes, money pumps, non‐complementarily

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