Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Truth and Realism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Patrick Greenough and Michael P. Lynch

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199288878

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 September 2019

A World without Isms: Life after Realism, Fictionalism, Non‐Cognitivism, Relativism, Reductionism, Revisionism, and so on

A World without Isms: Life after Realism, Fictionalism, Non‐Cognitivism, Relativism, Reductionism, Revisionism, and so on

Chapter:
(p.188) 10 A World without Isms: Life after Realism, Fictionalism, Non‐Cognitivism, Relativism, Reductionism, Revisionism, and so on
Source:
Truth and Realism
Author(s):
Paul Horwich
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.003.0011

This chapter amounts to something of a frontal assault on the very idea of a significant debate between realists and antirealists. It argues that philosophical progress on these matters is not possible because there is no meaningful debate to be had. Disputes over whether a fact ‘really’ exists or not emerge out of the desire to avoid allegedly ‘weird’ facts, like those about morality, mathematics, or art. So-called weird facts are so only because they seem so different from the facts with which we are more familiar in our everyday life: facts about cats, cars, kettles, cradles, and so on. As a result of this dissimilarity, we are tempted into constructing theories that explain the ‘nature’ of such facts, or somehow explain them away – even while allowing that our talk about such facts is in some sense legitimate. But all such attempts fail because they cannot explain a distinction they need: the distinction between a fact being real and really REAL. Thus, we either abandon or re-cast these debates, and give up on the idea that it makes sense to worry over the nature of reality as it is in itself.

Keywords:   truth, relativism, reality

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .