This chapter focuses on the question: ‘how simple is it possible for a self to be?’ from a number of different angles. Could a maximally simple subject exist, a subject which possesses only a single capacity for a rudimentary form of experience? Although the idea may initially seem absurd, the various objections dissolve under scrutiny. Could a subject take the form of a stream of experiences which are not the product of experiential powers? A minimal subject is nothing but a stream of consciousness. If such subjects are possible, the C-theory can easily be modified so as to accommodate them. The chapter closes by considering whether a partially (or weakly) unified consciousness is possible. If the answer to this question is ‘no’ then there is a sense in which selves are necessarily simpler than they would be if the answer were ‘yes’.
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