What is the relationship between an embodied human subject and the human animal which sustains the subject's mental capacities? After distinguishing the main ingredients of phenomenal embodiment (seeming to have a body), an account of embodiment itself is developed which does not require subjects actually to be in their bodies. In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that neo-Lockean accounts of the self inevitably double the number of subjects there actually are — this is sometimes called the ‘too many subjects’ problem. How one answers this objection depends on the stance one takes on other issues, e.g., some take the self to occupy just a part of its body, others say selves and their bodies exactly coincide (‘minimalism’ v. ‘maximalism’). The C-theory is not restricted to any one conception of embodiment, but it is most naturally construed along minimalist lines.
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